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U.S. SupremeCourtDecisions
Symposium I Forecasting

What'sLaw Gotto Do withIt?
SuzannaSherry

thattheresults
claimitssignificance,
prove
yetsuggest
I havea rather
theirmodela success.As a legalexpert,
on theresults.I look at thenumbers
different
perspective
notstatistically.
AndwhatI see tellsa different
holistically,
it
at
tells
story-if
anystory all.
treesused by the model to generate
The classification
a
of tangledbranches,becauseone
are
mass
predictions
vote
often
turnson anotherjustice'sprejustice'spredicted
dictedvote. By lookingat the predominant
variablesfor
each justice,however,one can concludethatthe predictionsforJustices
and Souterultimately
Ginsburg,Breyer,
turnsubstantially
on thepredicted
voteofJustice
O'Connor,
whilethe predictedvotesof ChiefJusticeRehnquistand
on thepreJustices
KennedyandThomasturnsubstantially
Scalia.Bylookingat theclassification
dictedvoteofJustice
O'Connor and Scalia,then,we can learna
treesforJustices
deal
abouthowthemodelworksforeightofthenine
great
themodelbeattheexperts
at predicting
justices.Moreover,
bothO'Connor and Scalia;indeed,thelargest
gapbetween
manand machinewasin predicting
howJustice
O'Connor
wouldvote.
So how did the modelpredictthevotesof O'Connor
and Scalia?Forbothjustices,thefirst
variableon theclassification
treeis whetherthelowercourtdecisionwas liberal or conservative.
For JusticeO'Connor,' the model
predictsthatshe will alwaysreversea liberallower-court
decision.Whethershe will reversea conservative
lowercourtdecisiondepends,first,
on thecircuitof origin(she
willaffirm
casesfromtheSecond,Third,DC, and Federal
circuits),thenon whetherthe respondentis the United
States,and finallyon the subjectmatterof the case. For
JusticeScalia, the treeis slightlymorecomplicatedand
moretiedto subjectmatter(seefig.1). Again,howslightly
ofthelower-court
ever,besidestheideologicalclassification
decision,thecircuitoforiginplaysa largerole:forconserSuzannaSherry
is the
vanderbilt.edu)
(suzanna.sherry@law.
Cal Turner
Law
and
at
VanderProfessor
of
Leadership
biltUniversity
Law School.Shethanks
RebeccaBrown,Paul
and
Erin
on earlierdrafts
comments
Edelman,
O'Harafor
this
of
essay.

cases
vativelowercourtdecisions,Scaliawillalwaysaffirm
fromtheThird,Fourth,Tenth,DC, and Federalcircuits,
but will affirm
onlysome typesof cases fromthe other
forliberallowercourtdecisions(in certainsubject
circuits;
casesfromtheFirst,
Third,Sixth,Sevareas),he willaffirm
casesfromthe
enth,Eighth,and DC circuitsand reverse
othercircuits.
who
follows
the
Anyone
politicsin, quality
of,or splitsamongthefederalcourtsofappealswillrecogofcircuits
nizethatthesecollections
havelittleor nothing
in common-theyseemcompletely
random.
Whilethestudy's
oforiauthorssuggestthatthe"circuit
"the
variable
has
to
do
with
one
should
gin"
agendaprocess,"
stillexpectto findsomecommonalities
amongthecircuits
or
I findnone.While
thatparticular
favor
disfavor.
justices
I do notexpectthestudy's
authorstobe abletofullyexplain
modelworks,I am troubled
wheneven
whytheirpredictive
withhindsight
we cannotmakesenseofthevariable.
The classification
treesforthesetwopivotaljustices-on
whosevotesmanyof theotherpredictions
rely-thusrest
firston politicsand secondon a completely
inexplicable
factor.
Leavingthelatterasidefora moment,theemphasis
on politicsmakesthemodelstrongly
attitudinal.
So what
are we to makeof the factthatthe expertsalso say they
reliedon an attitudinal
model?Howeverwe explainit,we
mustalsoaccountfortwostriking
in
results:
thedifferences
whichjusticeseach methodwas betterat predicting,
and
in relative
thedifferences
successratesof thetwomethods
on
the
issue
ofthecase.
area
depending
difference
betweenthemodel
First,thereis a significant
and theexpertswhenit comesto predicting
thevotesof
When
the
are
least
fro'm
particular
justices.2
justices arrayed
to mostconservative,
theexpertsuccessrateformsa rough
at predicting
thecensidewaysV; theyareleastsuccessful
tristjustices.The model'ssuccessrateon thesame chart,
isalmostan evenly
themodel
however,
increasing
percentage;
is worstat predicting
theliberaljustices,betterforthecenand bestfortheconservatives.
trists,
Second,comparingsuccessratesforindividualjustices
outcomes,as table 1
by subjectarea producesinteresting
shows.In criminal
the
bestedthemodel
procedure, experts
forfiveoftheninejustices,butformostofthejusticesthe
weresmall,lessthanfivepercentage
margins
points,andfor
all thejusticesitwaslessthanten.In civilrights,
themodel
December2004 I Vol.2/No.4 769
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Figure1
treeforjusticeScaliaforforecasted
cases
Estimated
classification
non-unanimous
Start

Lowercourt
decision
liberal?

Is theprimary
issue
economic
activity,

or
unions?
taxation,

Yes

No

Reverse

o

Case
from
Ist, No

2nd,5th,6th,7th,
8th,or9thcircuite

Affirmr

th
Casefrom
1st,3rd,6th,7th,
8th,orDC
circuit?

Yes

Affirm

o

issue
Isthe
attorneys,
primary
No.
-Affirm

or
Amendement,
power,
judicial
taxation?
federal
civilrights,
criminal
procedure,

Reverse

First
economicactivity,

Reverse
beat the expertson fiveof the nine justices,by larger
margins-in fourinstancesby morethanten percentage
points.In the economicactivityarea,the model signifitheexperts,
by
beatingthemregularly
cantlyoutperformed
Even
in
thosetwo fields,how20-30 percentage
points.
ever,the expertsmanagedto predictsome justicesbetter
thandid themodel.3
The expertsturnedthetablesin caseswithlesspolitical
ofindividual
salience.In federalism
cases4theirpredictions
intheaggrethe
accurate
than
model's
were
more
votes
justices'
to
Andin
a
70.4
53.5
percent
percent.
gateby largemargin:
the
outthe
casesinvolving
field,
swept
judicialpower, experts
and
on
the
model
every justice,
racking
predicting
770
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pointsabove
up successratesthatwere7.9 to82.2 percentage
thoseofthemodel.As theauthorspointout,thesestatistics
mightbe questionedbecauseofthesmallnumberofcases
in individualcodingdecisions,but they
and theflexibility
nonetheless.
areintriguing
What mightexplainall of thesefacts?I suggestthatthe
liberaljusticesvote the law,the conservative
justicesvote
Consider
do
theirpolitics,and thecentrist
neither.5
justices
thedifferent
attitudinalist
theevidenceregarding
approaches
trees
of themodeland theexperts.Boththeclassification
and thefactthatthe modeldid poorlyin areaswithlow
politicalsalience-and bestin cases involvingcivilrights
whichhave perhaps
and regulation
of economicactivity,

Table 1
Percentcorrectmodeland expertforecastsof votes,byjusticeand issue area
Federalism
Criminal
Civilrights
Economicactivity
Judicialpower
procedure
Model
Model
Model
Model
Model
Justice
Experts
Experts
Experts
Experts
Experts
75.0
77.8
85.7
91.4
81.2
51.3
80.0
33.3
84.2
Rehnquist 69.2
40.0
50.0
Stevens
84.6
80.6
57.1
68.6
56.2
64.1
100.0
84.2
48.6
60.0
58.3
37.5
O'Connor
76.9
75.0
64.3
86.7
55.6
68.4
50.0
84.6
75.0
78.6
97.1
75.0
48.7
60.0
37.5
Scalia
68.4
75.0
50.0
69.2
77.8
85.7
82.4
75.0
51.3
100.0
57.9
Kennedy
84.6
61.1
85.7
57.1
56.2
61.5
20.0
91.7
25.0
Souter
73.7
50.0
80.0
58.3
68.4
Thomas
84.6
86.1
85.7
94.3
60.0
37.5
76.9
71.4
77.8
60.0
62.5
59.0
0.0
100.0
12.5
94.7
Ginsburg
12.5
69.2
64.3
51.4
60.0
70.3
40.0
66.7
69.4
84.2
Breyer
Note:Forcriminal
(n = 14); economicactivity
(n = 5) cases.
(n = 13); civilrights
(n = 16),judicialpower(n = 8), and federalism
procedure

toSpaeth'sprotocol,
andaremutually
exclusive.
Issueareasarecodedaccording

thehighestpoliticalvisibility-suggest
thatpoliticsplayed also explainthe experts'abilityto predictthe threemost
a largerolein themodel'spredictions.
conservative
The experts,
on the
justicesalmostas wellas themodeldoes:their
otherhand,whileconfessing
to usingthejustice'sideology relianceon attitudinalism
forthe
mayhavebeenstrongest
in makingtheirpredictions,
as
most
did worstin areaswhereone
committed.
justicestheyperceived
ideologically
Forthefourmostliberal
mightexpectan attitudinalistapproachto succeedand
justices,the model fared
bestin morelegalistic
areas.
votethelaw,theconservative poorlyusingan attitudinalLiberal
justices
did not
istapproachtopredicttheir
Perhapstheexperts
andthecentrist
votes-muchworsethanit
votetheir
actuallyfocuson ideology,
justices
politics,
orperhaps
did for the conservatives.
theyarejustpoor
attitudinalists.
do neither.
The experts,
however,
justices
Maybethey
pretheirattidicted the liberaljustices
simplytempered
tudinalistpredictions
with
almostas well as theydid
And theirpredictions
weremostaccurate
knowledgeabout the extentto whichpoliticsinfluences theconservatives.
each particularjustice,usingan attitudinalist
model for overall-ranging
froma lowof58 percentforJustice
Kensome
asked
the
to
a
of
for
95
(The
only
justices.
experts nedy high
questionnaires
percent Justice
Ginsburg-oncases
whatfactors
considered
for
each
not
each
of
The
successrate
case,
they
justice, raisingquestions judicialpower. experts'
so theymighthaveusedideologyforonlysomejustices.)In
washigherthan70 percent
forallfourliberaljusticesin this
ofthestudy's
itseems area(see table1). This pattern
is exactly
theconverse
ofthe
authors,
anycase,despitetheprotests
fairto suggestthatthemodeladopteda moreattitudinalist onewe findin themodel'spredictions
oftheliberals'votes,
a
thatthe expertswere usinga legalist,rather
approach(withsomeadditionalnuances)and theexperts
confirming
morelegalistapproach(again,withsomenuances,and perthanattitudinalist,
approach-at leastforthe liberaljusfor
some
tices.
the
confirm
thatthelegal
And,indeed, questionnaires
hapsonly
justices).
It is theneasyto explainthemodel'spatternof success. expertsused legalprecedentand legalanalysis-again,at
The moreconservative
thejustice,thelargertheroleplayed leastforpredicting
somejustices.
and
the
more
the
accurate
model's
If
the
attitudinalmodel
uses
a predominantly
attitudinalist
byideology
approach
istprediction.
this
is consistent
with
and theexperts
use a legalistapproachmostof
Moreover, explanation
throughout,
thefactssurrounding
theappointment
ofeachjustice.The
thetimebutan attitudinalist
approachfortheconservative
most conservative
whatcanweconcludeaboutthevarious
from
justices-Scalia, Thomas, and Rehnjustices,
justices
(orelevated)byconservative
quist-werenominated
Repub- thepatternof successrates?Legalism,but not attitudinallican presidents
forwhom ideologyplayedan important ism,is a betterwayto predictthevotesofthefourliberals
rolein theselectionprocess,and confirmed
by a Republi- becausetheyplacemoreemphasison law thanon politics.
can Senateor bya narrowmarginthatincludedonlya few Attitudinalism,
worksjustfineforthethreeconhowever,
Democrats.Two ofthefourliberaljustices,however,
were
servatives
(exceptin casesinwhichpoliticsisunimportant),
nominatedby Republicans-howideologicalcould they becausetheirvotesin factdependmoreon politicsthanon
be?-and theothertwobya moderateDemocratwithonly
law.In otherwords,theliberals
votethelawandtheconsertokenoppositionfromSenateRepublicans.6
This might vativesvotetheirpolitics,as I contendedearlier.
December2004 i Vol.2/No.4 771
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What about the two centrists,
JusticesO'Connor and
One
is
that
attitudinalism
their
Kennedy? possibility
predicts
votesfairly
not
as
it
as
accurately
accurately does
(although
fortheconservatives),
but thattheexpertsdon'trecognize
thatfactas wellas theydo withthemoreconservative
justices.The experts'
mistaken
thatO'Connorand
assumption
Kennedybehaveliketheliberals-lookingat thelaw more
thanat politics-producesthedistinctive
V-shape,and the
twojustices'failureto conform
to an attitudinalist
entirely
approachputsO'Connor and Kennedyaboutin themiddle of themodel'ssuccessrate.This suggeststhatneither
accurately
capturesthe influlegalismnor attitudinalism
leaves
enceson thesetwojustices.Butsuchan explanation
us witha question:what doesdetermine
how O'Connor
and Kennedywillvote?
Whichbringsusbacktotheadditionalfactors
on theclassification
trees.ForKennedy,
theonlynonpolitical
variableis
thecircuit
oforigin;forO'Connor,thecircuit
oforiginisthe
variableafter
thepoliticalslantofthelowermostimportant
withcivil
courtdecision,althoughshealso favorsplaintiffs
or
first
amendment
claims
economic
liberties,
rights,
against
theUnitedStates,andstates'rights.
"fed(Sheisa libertarian
that
in
other
eralist,"
considering her
words-unsurprising
in
a
a
includes
stint
legislature.)7But
sagebrush
background
law nor
what
neither
does
the
circuit
of
why
originexplain
of
I
conclusion
short
bizarre.
can?
find
that
politics
nothing
else
be
and
the
apparentinfluSomething must goingon,
enceofcircuitoforiginis simplycoincidental.
Whatis thesomething
else?I am afraidthatit mightbe
puregutreaction,the"I knowit whenI see it" ofJustice
As thestudyauthors
ofpornography.8
Stewart's
definition
note,"thelegalexperts
putgreatweighton legalauthorityin theformofpriorSupremeCourtopinions-in
primarily
And yettheexpertswereworst
their
predictions."
making
O'Connor
and Kennedy,suggesting
at predicting
Justices
do
that
these
two
placevery
justices notthemselves
perhaps
muchweighton legalauthority.9
And, in fact,the votesof the two justices-especially
a
O'Connor-in somekeycasesofthe2002 termillustrate
rathercavalierattitudetowardprecedent.
JusticeKennedy,
in Lawin hisrejection
ofprecedent
at least,wasforthright
Bowersv.
rencev. Texas,votingto overrulethe 17-year-old
was less candid
Hardwick.JusticeO'Connor in Lawrence
on theinconsistency
betweenhervoteand herpriorviews:
held that
in 1986 she joined an opinionthatessentially
werebound
whichheterosexuals
had no rights
homosexuals
thatlegislatures
could
torespect,
butthenruledin Lawrence
crimcriminalize
homosexual
notrationally
sodomywithout
sodomyas well.(I am notsuggesting
inalizingheterosexual
that Bowersshould not have been overruled,only that
O'Connor'sconcurring
Lawrence-andparticularly
Justice
thecentrists'
quirkydecisionmaking.)
opinion-illustrates
JusticeO'Connor was also a pivotalvote-and in one
case the authorof theopinion-in threeothercasesthat
paid onlylip serviceto precedent.In NevadaDepartment
772
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v.Hibbs,shejoineda majority
ofHumanResources
upholdin
ing Congress'sabrogationof statesovereignimmunity
theFamilyand MedicalLeaveAct,thusallowingstatesto
be suedfordamagesbyindividuals
who claimedthattheir
stateemployer
FMLA.
the
violated
Priorcaseshad invalidated similarattemptedabrogationsundertheAge Disin Employment
crimination
Act and theAmericanswith
DisabilitiesAct, concludingthatCongressdid not have
sufficient
evidenceof a patternof stateconstitutional
violationsto enact remedialstatutes.The evidenceof state
constitutional
violationssupporting
the FMLA, however,
was no stronger
thanthe evidencesupporting
the ADA.
conMoreover,of the eightcircuitsthathad previously
thequestion,sevenhad foundtheFMLA abrogafronted
tion invalidunderthe precedents-further
evidencethat
the Court'sdecisionwas inconsistent
withitspriorcases.
ChiefJusticeRehnquist'smajorityopinion,
Nevertheless,
to applytheearlierprecO'Connor,
joined by
purported
edent. O'Connor and Rehnquistwere the only justices
who werein themajorityin boththeearliercasesand in
thattheirview of the precedent
Hibbs,again suggesting
was unusual.10
In Demorev. Kim,JusticeO'Connor providedthefifth
vote upholdingthe constitutionality
of detainingdeportablealienspendinga deportation
withoutanyindihearing,
vidualizeddetermination
of theirdangerousness
or riskof
two
yearsearlier,she had providedthe fifth
flight.Only
votein Zadvydasv.Davis,whichheldunconstitutional
the
ofalienswhohad beenordereddeported(aftera
detention
hearing)but who wererequiredto remainin the United
Statesbecauseno othernationwould acceptthem.Other
thanJustice
O'Connor,thereis no overlapin themajorities
in thetwocases,suggesting
thatperhapstheyareinconsistent.While the casesmayarguablybe distinguishable
on
theirfacts,whatis noteworthy
is thatthemajority
opinion
in DemorecitesJusticeKennedy'sZadvydasdissentmore
thanit citestheZadvydasmajority
opinion.
v.Bollinger,
in whichtheCourt
considerGrutter
Finally,
the
of
Law
School'saffirmative
upheld University Michigan
actionprogram.
O'Connor's
Justice
opinionpurmajority
whichrequires
thattheaffirscrutiny,
portedto applystrict
mativeactionprogram
be "necessary
to"or"narrowly
tailored
to achieve"thestate's
in
a
diverse
interest
racially
compelling
studentbody.She nevertheless
deferred
to theuniversity's
ofa raciallydiversestuown determination
of thebenefits
dentbody,thelack of alternative
methodsof obtaininga
natureof
raciallydiversestudentbody,and thetemporary
The Courthas neverbeforeuphelda racially
theprogram.
norhas it
statepolicyunderstrictscrutiny,
discriminatory
thatthechallenged
eversuggested
programis due anydeferencefromthe Court. Instead,it has alwaysdemanded
thatsuchprograms
be subjectedto themostsearching
scrutiny.(Threeof the fourjusticeswho joined her opinion
ofordinary
strict
rejectedtheapplication
scrutiny
explicitly
to affirmative
on thesamedaythatit
action.)1"Moreover,

actionprogram,the
upheldthe Law School'saffirmative
actionprogramusedby
Courtstruckdowntheaffirmative
admissions.
the University
of Michiganin undergraduate
in
were
the
in
O'Connor
and
OnlyJustices
Breyer
majority
in bothcasespointedout,the
bothcases.As thedissenters
betweenthe undergraduate
onlydifference
programand
was
was thattheundergraduate
thelaw program
program
morecandidabouttheroleplayedbyrace.
Thesecasesprovideanecdotalevidencethatcomplements
KenOverthecourseoftheterm,
theproject's
results.
Justices
nedyand O'Connor (especiallyO'Connor) confounded
to predicttheirvotes.
who reliedon legalprecedent
experts
In thesecases,we can see howJustice
O'Connor (and,to a
lesserextent
andmorecandidly,
Justice
Kennedy)treats
precwereunableto preedent,whichexplainswhylegalexperts
dicthervotes.We arenowleftonlyto explainwhyJustice
O'Connor'serratic
votes-based on neitherprecedent
nor
ascircuit
oforigin.
politics-seemtotracksuchoddvariables
Ifone stepsbackfromindividualcasesin whicha justice
however,thereis anotherpossible
misappliedprecedent,
for
in predicting
the
explanation
poorperformance
experts'
thecentrists'
votes,althoughitdoesnotexplaintherelative
successof the computermodel. If JusticesKennedyand
O'Connor aretakingan essentially
approachto
pragmatist
and
everyangle
legalquestions-exploring
heavily
relying
on fact-specific
context-theirdecisionsmightbe moredifficultto predict,especiallyif the expertsthemselves
were
notpragmatists
not
did
read
and
O'Connor
as
(or
Kennedy
Were
it
not
for
in
the
lack
of
candor
exhibited
pragmatists).
themanipulation
ofprecedent,
thisresultmightactuallybe
that
the
two justicesengagein a
encouraging,
suggesting
typicalcommon-law
process.12
decision-making
But perhaps the model's ability to predictJustice
O'Connorbetter
thantheexperts
is a fluke.In otherwords,
theremightalso be nothinggoingon. The authorsadmit
thatthestudyis of limitedsignificance
becauseof itsnecessarilynarrowfocus,thesmallnumberof cases,and the
unscientific
selectionof experts."3
There is also a serious
with
on
those
decisions,
problem
relying coding
especially
createdand appliedbynonlawyers.
The codingchoicesare
and inevitably
leadto internal
inconinevitably
ambiguous,
sistencies.For example,the difference
between"judicial
is fuzzy,especiallyin any case
power"and "federalism"
the
of
whether
a federal
court-as opposed
raising question
to a statecourt-has jurisdiction.
And, as noted above,
severalobvious(to lawyers)federalism
caseswerecoded as
economicactivity
a difcases-presumably
bynonlawyers;
ferentcodermighthavemade a different
choice.Indeed,
different
codersdo makedifferent
choices.Harold Spaeth
codedabouthalfthe68 casesin thesample.The
originally
coded the otherhalf,which
projectauthorstentatively
34 cases (half
Spaethlaterrecoded.Of theapproximately
of 68) thatSpaethrecoded,16 weregivendifferent
codes.
Leavingaside the problemof "predictive"
recodingafter
the SupremeCourt has alreadyissuedits ruling,the fact

thatSpaethand the projectauthorsdisagreedabout the
appropriate
codingin almosthalfthecasestheybothcoded
the
of consistent
coding.14
suggests impossibility
the
idea
that
bya lower
everydecision-whether
Finally,
courtor bytheSupremeCourt-can be coherently
coded
or"conservative"
nonsense.
as either"liberal"
on
How,
verges
forexample,shouldone code Nguyenv. UnitedStates,in
whicha paneloftheNinthCircuituphelda criminalconvictionagainstvariouscriminalprocedurechallengesbut
the SupremeCourtreversed
on thegroundthathavinga
from
the
Mariana
Islands
(a federal
judgebutnotan
judge
ArticleIII judge) on the panelviolateda federalstatute?
thelineupin theSupremeCourtwaspecuUnsurprisingly,
liar:ChiefJusticeRehnquistwrotea dissenting
opinion,
and Breyer.
whichwas joinedbyJustices
Scalia,Ginsburg,
In additionto codingdecisions,
theresults
arealsohighly
casesin thesample,and there
dependenton theparticular
is evidenceto suggestthatthisterm's
casesareunrepresentativeofthisCourtin general.It waswidelysuggested
that
theCourtwasunusually
andsurprisingly
liberalinthe2002
Some statistics
bearthisout. Of the 16 cases,or
term.15
of
that
were
decidedbya 5-4 majority,
thefive
cases,
parts
were
in
the
in
mostconservative
five
cases
justices
majority
in seven(in
and thefourmostliberalwerein themajority
theremaining
fourcases,themajority
consistedofa mixof
conservatives
and liberals).Of the12 casesor partsofcases
decidedby a 6-3 vote,therewerefourin whichthe five
mostconservative
and fivein
justiceswerein themajority,
whichthefourmostliberaljustices
were.(Again,theremaintimein thisCourt's
ingcasesweremixed.)This is thefirst
nineyearsthattheliberalswon moreclosecasesthanthe
conservatives.
The farrightjustices,Scalia and Thomas,
werethemostfrequent
in pasttermsthefarleft
dissenters;
Stevenshasbeenthemostfrequent
dissenter.
MoreJustice
themostconservative
inthenation,
over,theFourthCircuit,
was the leastreversed
circuitforthe 2001 term(witha
reversal
rateof 64 percent)but had a reversal
rateof 100
for
the
2002
term.
While
none
of
these
resultsare
percent
to
be
do
tend
to
confirm
likely
statistically
significant,
they
theimpression
ofan unusually
liberalterm.
Ifthistermwas in factaberrational,
and especially
ifthe
votes
of
O'Connor
and
Justices
pivotal
Kennedywere
unusual,thenthefactthattheproject'sresultsarestatistiforthistermis unlikely
to be repeated.
This
callysignificant
termsimplymighthavebeenoneofthe2.5 percent
ofcases
inwhichtheseresults
couldbe producedbyrandomchance.
Here'sa challengeto themodelfromone expert:tryagain
in a morerepresentative
term(and withexperts
who have
lessintellectual
stakein theoutcomes)and we'llbeatyou
fairand square.

Conclusion
Theysaythatno newsis goodnews.Thisstudyis eitherno
newsor bad news.Eitherthe resultsare an artifact
of a
December2004 I Vol.2/No.4 773
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or the
peculiarterm,poor coding,and thewrongexperts,
resultstellus thatthevotesof twopivotalSupremeCourt
randomfacjusticesdependon eitherpoliticsor seemingly
tors.Those ofus who havespentyearsarguingthatconstitutionallawis truly
law,notjustpolitics,andthatjudgesdo
thebesttheycan,weredisheartened
in late2000 byBushv.
Gore.Most of us recovered.
Now comesthe new millenniumand a computermodelto inform
us thatwe regained
confidence
too
soon.
rather
haveno news.
our
I'd
Personally,

Notes

A complete
listfortheentire
reference
symposium
appearson
below.
791-93,
pp.
1 See Martinet al. 2004, fig.1, forO'Connor'sclassificationtree.
2 Ibid.,fig.2.
theresultsdependsignificantly
3 Moreover,
on questionable codingdecisions:4 ofthe 16 casescoded as economicactivity
are,I wouldsuggest,
reallyfederalism
or judicialpowercases.PierceCounty
v. Guillenraised
thequestionwhether
was
to make
entitled
Congress
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